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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the case.

Valarie Posey (hereinafter "Posey"), appeals from the District Court's Appellate Opinion
and Order affirming the magistrate's denial of Posey's Motion to Suppress on the charge of
driving under the influence, excessive alcohol concentration. R, pp. 175-183. In particular,
Posey challenges the District Court's finding that the community caretaking function doctrine is
applicable in the context of entry into a home. The District Court made certain conclusions that
are not supported by the factual record.

Finally, the district Court erred in finding that the

officer's actions in this case were a reasonable exercise of his community caretaking function.
II.

Course of the Proceedings Below.

On March 24, 2011, Coeur d'Alene Police Officer Shane A vriett arrested the Defendant,
Valarie Lynn Posey, on the charges of driving under the influence with excessive alcohol
concentration, Idaho Code § 18-8004C; failure to give immediate notice of accident, Idaho Code

§ 49-1305; open container of alcohol, Idaho Code § 23-505; and driving with an invalid license,
Idaho Code § 49-301. R, pp. 7-9 and 25-27. On April 28, 2011, the State filed an Amended
Criminal Complaint, clarifying that the driving under the influence charge was enhanced to
allege an excessive alcohol concentration, and to replace the charge of failure to give immediate
notice of accident with the charge of accident involving damage to vehicle, Idaho Code § 491301. R, pp. 39-40.
On May 2, 2011 Posey filed a Motion to Suppress any and all evidence gathered her,
"including all statements made by the defendant, the observations made by the officers of the
1

defendant before, during and after the stop, and any evidence seized subsequent to the stop,"
alleging that the warrantless entry into defendant's home by the officers was unlawful and
without legal justification, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
State of Idaho. R., pp. 41-42. An evidentiary hearing on Posey's Motion to Suppress was held
on May 27,2011. After hearing the evidence, the magistrate denied Posey's Motion to Suppress.
R., pp. 54-55.
On June 6, 2011, Posey entered a Conditional Guilty Plea to the driving under the
influence charge, and a guilty plea to the charge of accident involving damage to vehicle. R., pp.
57-58.

The charges of open container of alcohol and driving with an invalid license were

dismissed. R., pp. 61-62. After obtaining a substance abuse evaluation, Posey was sentenced on
July 28,2011. R., pp. 68-69. On August 15,2011, Posey filed a timely Notice of Appeal of the
magistrate's denial of her Motion to Suppress. R., pp. 73-75.
Oral argument was held via telephone hearing before the Honorable Carl Kerrick, District
Judge, on February 29, 2012. R., pp. 172-173. During oral argument, defense counsel agreed
that the defense did not take issue with any of the magistrate's factual findings. App. Tr. p. 12,

L. 4_8.' On March 23, 2012, Judge Kerrick entered an Appellate Opinion and Order, affirming
the magistrate's denial of Posey's Motion to Suppress. R., pp. 175-183. On April 24, 2012,
Posey filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. R., pp. 188-191.

I

Transcript of oral argument on appeal to District Court held on February 29, 2012.
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III.

Statement of the Facts.

At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that there was no warrant in this
case. Tr. p. 1, L. 20 - 21.2 Shane Avriett of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department was the only
witness who testified at the suppression hearing. According to his testimony, on March 24,
2011, Officer Avriett was a patrol officer assigned to the Traffic Division with the City of Coeur
d'Alene Police Department. Tr. p. 3, L. 4 - 5. He was on duty on that day at approximately 4:00
in the afternoon, when he responded to an accident on

4th

Street, just south of 1-90, where

4th

and

3rd separate by the Dave Smith car dealership. Tr. p. 4, L. 23 - 25; p. 5, L. 1 - 5. When Officer
Avriett arrived on scene, he saw a red car blocking northbound traffic. Tr. p. 5, L. 10- 11. The
car had significant damage on the driver's side front fender and door area, and the airbags had
deployed. Tr. p. 5, L. 12 - 13; p. 6, L. 5. Officer Avriett also saw at the scene what he believed
to be a gray or silver SUV with damage. Tr. p. 5, 13 - 14. There was a young girl at the scene
of a "verbal age" of 12, who had blood coming out of her mouth. Tr. p. 5, L. 19 - 21.
The driver of the red car was not at the scene. Tr. p. 6, L. 12 - 13. An Officer Morgan
told Officer Avriett that witnesses had seen the driver leave on foot, westbound. Tr. p. 6, L. 15 17. Dispatch relayed to Officer A vriett that they were on the phone with a reporting party who
was following the female driver of the red car, as she traveled westbound on Homestead. Tr. p.
7, L. 5 - 9. After receiving that information from dispatch, Officer A vriett responded to that
area. Tr. p. 7, L. 10 - 12. The reporting party flagged down Officer Avriett. Tr. p. 8, L. 4 - 5.
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Transcript of hearing on Posey's Motion to Suppress held on May 27,2011.
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The reporting party told Officer Avriett that he had followed the female driver, who had
been the sole occupant, from the crash, down Homestead. Tr. p. 8, L. 8 - 9. The reporting party
thought that the female appeared to be "completely out of it", and she was bleeding from the
face. Tr. p. 8, L. 9 - 13. The female had reportedly gone into the house on the corner of
Homestead and Government [Way]. Tr. p. 8, L. 13 - 18. Officer Avriett thought that the
information that he received from the reporting party might have been "piecemeal", rather than
given to him all at one time. Tr. p. 8, L. 24 - 25; p. 9, L. 1 - 2. The reporting party remained at
the corner of Homestead and Government Way the entire time Officer A vriett was investigating
the accident. Tr. p. 9, L. 12 - 15. Officer Avriett believed he had gone back and contacted the
reporting party probably two or three times. Tr. p. 9, L. 8 - 9.
Officer Avriett wanted to get the person to come out of the house. Tr. p. 9, L. 6 - 7. He
tried knocking on the door, but there was no answer. Tr. p. 9, L. 18 - 19. Officer Avriett
thought he had knocked on the door a few times. Tr. p. 9, L. 25. He did not hear any movement
inside, nor hear any voices. Tr. p. 10, L. 2 - 5. Officer A vriett contacted a supervisor by radio,
and obtained approval to "breach" the door. Tr. p. 10, L. 8; L. 19. Officer Avriett was uncertain
whether he asked to speak to a supervisor prior to the reporting party telling him that Posey had
scratches on her face and was bleeding. Tr. p. 18, L. 6 - 10. Officer Avriett attempted to kick
the door open, "maybe six times", but he was not able to "breach" the door by foot. Tr. p. 10, L.
20 - 22. He didn't remember whether he announced who he was when he knocked on the door,
but Officer A vriett testified that he announced, "Coeur d'Alene Police, open the door" before he
started kicking the door. Tr. p. 11, L. 1 - 6.
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When he was unable to kick the front door of the house open, Officer Avriett borrowed a
large sledge hammer from fire personnel who were on scene. Tr. p. 12, L. 3 - 5. Before using·
the sledge hammer, Officer Avriett saw that the door knob of the front door was "being turned,
attempted to be turned". Tr. p. 12, L. 12 - 13. He also observed that the door jamb was split.
Tr. p. 12, L. 13 - 16. Officer Avriett had damaged the door jamb trying to get in the door. Tr. p.
18, L. 18 - 21; L. 25; P. 19, L. 1 - 2. Officer Avriett "wasn't sure ifthe person was either trying
to barricade the door or trying to open it themselves". Tr. p. 12, L. 20 - 21. When asked by the
State why he made the decision to tell whomever to "step away from the door", rather than "can
you open the door" or something else, Officer Avriett referred to past experiences when people
want to hide from the police. Tr. p. 13, L. 8 - 10; L. 14 - 15.
Officer Avriett was able to break open the front door of the house with the sledge
hammer. Tr. p. 13, L. 19 - 21. The first thing he saw after breaking open the door was an
elderly gentleman. Tr. p. 13, L. 25; p. 14, L. 1. He asked the elderly gentleman "where the
female was that had come in the house", and the elderly gentleman pointed behind the door that
Officer Avriett had just "broke in". Tr. p. 14, L. 3 - 5. The female, later identified as Posey,
was holding a washcloth against her face. Tr. p. 14, L. 10. Officer Avriett told Posey to go
outside, but she didn't immediately move. Tr. p. 14, L. 19. Posey told Officer Avriett, "I'm
fine, I'm fine" when he was ordering Posey to go outside and see medical. Tr. p. 19, L. 9 - 11.
Posey declined medical attention. Tr. p. 15, L. 13 - 14.
On cross-examination, Officer Avriett admitted that Posey had allegedly walked several
blocks from the scene of the crash to the home on Government Way under her own power. Tr. p.
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16, L. 7 - 10. At the time that Officer Avriett went to the residence on Government Way to try
to make contact with Posey, he was aware that she had allegedly committed the crime of leaving
the scene of an injury accident. Tr. p. 16, L. 13 - 17. Officer Avriett believed he had the right to
enter the home if Posey were injured, but admitted that he did not have the right to enter the
home if she was hiding from police. Tr. p. 17, L. 8 - 18. Officer Avriett admitted that before he
forcibly entered the home, he did not know whether Posey was injured so badly that she wasn't
thinking straight. Tr. p. 17,22 - 25; p. 18, L. 1 - 2.
During the cross-examination of Officer A vriett, the video recording of the incident was
entered into evidence and played for the court. The audio portion of the video that was picked
up in the recording of the suppression hearing reveals the following.

Officer Avriett states,

"Central 312 said you have a supervisor on Channel 2." Then there are banging sounds. Tr. p.
25, L. 19 - 20. It was after that when the reporting party told Officer Avriett, "She's not okay.
(inaudible) ... her face was cut up and bleeding." Tr. p. 26, L. 13 - 14. Officer Avriett asked
the reporting party "Did she appear intoxicated or just ... ", and the reporting party replied, "I
couldn't tell." Tr. p. 26, L. 19 - 20.
Just before breaking the front door of the house open, Officer Avriett stated, "Coeur
d'Alene Police. Open the door. Last warning." Tr. p. 27, L. 9. "Step back away from the door.
Step back away from the door. (inaudible) ... I'm gonna hit the door. Step back." Tr. p. 27, L.
15 - 16. After making contact with Posey inside the house, Officer Avriett said to her, "Step
outside for me with medical. Go ahead Valerie [sic]. Go." Tr. p. 27, L. 19 - 20. "Step out there
with (inaudible) ... go (inaudible) ... How much did you have to drink today, Valerie [sic]?"
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Tr. p. 27, L. 24 - 25. Posey told Officer Avriett, "I'm -- I'm fine." Tr. p. 28, L. 4. Officer
Avriett replied, "No. Come over here. Why don't you step over here for me? Come on, Valerie
[sic]." Tr. p. 28, L. 5 - 6.
After hearing the evidence, the magistrate found that the entry into the home was made
without a search warrant, and that "[mlost of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement
are not met here". Tr. p. 45, L. 12 - 14. The magistrate further found that "[t]he only one that
really does match, in my mind, is the community caretaking function." Tr. p. 45, L. 18 - 19.
The magistrate referred to State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752 (1997), and quoted that opinion as
stating
The constitutional standard is whether the intrusive action of the police was
reasonable in view of all of the surrounding circumstances. Reasonableness is
determined by balancing the public need and interest furthered by the police
conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of the
citizen.
Tr. p. 46, L. 12 - 17.
The magistrate also made reference to State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992), quoting, "In order
for the community caretaking function analysis to apply an officer must possess a subjective
belief that an individual is in need of immediate assistance. Although the officer may harbor at
least an expectation of detecting or finding evidence of a crime." Tr. p. 46, L. 19 - 23.
The magistrate found in the current case:
clearly there's an accident involved. Clearly people are injured. We have the 12
year old that's injured there at the scene. We've got airbags deployed. Severe
damage to the red car.
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The driver of the vehicle is gone. A reporting [sic] following them over to
another location, after the person tried to get the car doing [sic] again, even
though the car is clearly not drivable at that point. Has to take the keys away
from the person. Describes the person to the officer as being "out of it", bleeding
from the face.
So, you know, the officer, I think, reasonably, under these circumstances, has a
belief that the individual is need [sic] of immediate assistance. Okay.
Tr. p. 47, L. 16 - 25; p. 48, L. 1 -2.
As to the use of a sledge hammer to gain entry into the house, the magistrate found that
"[t]hat is way at the end of what might be considered reasonable in going into somebody's
house." Tr. p. 48, L. 5 - 6. Ultimately, the magistrate found that under the circumstances of this
case, "I'm constrained to find that this is an appropriate use of the community caretaking
function," and denied Posey's Motion to Suppress.
In its Appellate Opinion and Order (hereinafter "Opinion"), the District Court made the
following conclusions while acting in its appellate capacity, from a factual record made in the
magistrate court:
"Further, [the officer] had contact with the reporting party which established the
driver was acting in a manner indicating she needed medical care for injuries she
had sustained in the collision." R., p. 180.
"In this case, a bystander was concerned about the Appellant's welfare to the
extent that he followed her several blocks and explained to officers that she
sustained injuries in the crash." R., p. 181.
The District Court responded to Posey's argument that the Idaho case law which
addresses the community caretaking function is limited to instances where vehicles are searched
by stating that "[t]his argument ignores the fact that the circumstances in the case at hand arose
as the result of a collision between two vehicles, one of which the Appellant was driving." R, p.
181.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Is there an applicable exception to the warrant requirement that justified the police

officer's entry into Posey's home?
2.

If the entry into Posey's home was unlawful, should the evidence obtained

thereby be excluded?

9

ARGUMENT
1.

Standard of Review.

When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, the
Supreme Court will review the record and the magistrate court's decision independently of, but
with due regard for, the district court's decision.

Lasser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672

(2008). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843
(2004).
II.

There is No Applicable Exception to the Warrant Requirement that Justified the

Police Officer's Entry into Posey's Home.
A.

Applicable Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees every citizen the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 888
(et. App. 2008); State v. Salois, 144 Idaho 344, 347 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho

736, 737 (Ct. App. 2005). Its purpose is "to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the
exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to
'safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.' " Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312
(1978)). The sanctity and privacy of a home is protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against
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which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. United States v. United States Dist.

Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). At the very core of the Fourth
Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).

Warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 586.
The state bears the burden to show that a warrantless search either fell within one of these wellrecognized exceptions to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the

State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374 (Ct. App. 2009).

circumstances.

Therefore, absent

circumstances that fit within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, evidence
acquired through the warrantless search of a home must be suppressed. State v. McBaine, 144
Idaho 130, 133 (Ct. App. 2007).
B.

Community Caretaking Function.
1.

History of Community Caretaking Function.

A citizen is not considered to be "seized" by a law enforcement officer who is performing
an officer's community caretaking function. The community caretaking function involves the
duty of police to help individuals officers believe are in need of immediate assistance. State v.

Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 303 (Ct. App. 2002). The term "community caretaking functions" was
first used by the United States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In

Cady, after the defendant crashed a Thunderbird automobile, a passing motorist took him to a
tavern in town, and the defendant called the local police. Id. 413 U.S. at 435-36. The police
picked up the defendant, noticed he appeared intoxicated, and drove him to the scene of the
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accident. Id. at 436. The defendant informed the police that he was a Chicago police officer. Id.
The officers believed that regulations required Chicago police officers to carry their service
revolver at all times, the defendant did not have his revolver on him, and the officers could not
find it after searching the front seat and the glove compartment of the Thunderbird. Id. The
Thunderbird was towed to a privately owned garage where no police guard was posted. Id. The
defendant was eventually arrested but taken to a local hospital where he lapsed into a coma. Id.
Later that night, officers went to the tow yard to search for the missing revolver and, in the
process, found evidence linking the defendant to a murder. Id. at 436-37.
The issue for the Cady Court's determination was whether the officers' warrantless
search of the Thunderbird violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment Right to be free from the
unreasonable search and seizure of his car.

Id. at 442.

The Court began its analysis by

reviewing its own precedent regarding searches of automobiles, in contrast to searches of homes.
Id at 439-40 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967)).

Recognizing that the Fourth

Amendment did not apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment until Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), was decided twelve years earlier, the Court noted that most of its precedent
on the subject of searches and seizures dealt with the actions of the federal government. Cady,
413 U.S. at 440-41. The Court then provided the following analysis:
As a result of our federal system of government, however, state and local
police officers, unlike federal officers, have much more contact with vehicles for
reasons related to the operation of vehicles themselves. All States require
vehicles to be registered and operators to be licensed. States and localities have

12

enacted extensive and detailed codes regulating the condition and manner
which motor vehicles may be operated on public streets and highways.

III

Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and
also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or
involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact
involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in
a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may believe
the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be of that
nature. Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate
vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in
what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking
functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.

Id. at 441.
The Cady Court further discussed the distinction made between automobiles and homes
in its Fourth Amendment analysis:
Although the original justification advanced for treating automobiles
differently from houses, insofar as warrantless searches of automobiles by federal
officers was concerned, was the vagrant and mobile nature of the former,
[citations omitted] warrantless searches of vehicles by state officers have been
sustained in cases in which the possibilities of the vehicle's being removed or
evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent. [Citations omitted.] The
constitutional difference between searches of and seizures from houses and
similar structures and from vehicles stems both from the ambulatory character of
the latter and from the fact that extensive, and often noncriminal contact with
automobiles will bring local officials in 'plain view' of evidence, fruits, or
instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband.

Id. at 441-442.
An Idaho appellate court first applied the community caretaking function in Matter of

Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 (1988). In Clayton, during the early morning hours a police officer,

observed a vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to a bar. Id. at 818. The vehicle's engine was
running and the headlights were on, and an individual, later identified as Clayton, was sitting in
the driver's seat behind the steering wheel, with his head slumped forward. Id.
13

The officer

decided to approach the vehicle to determine whether the person was in need of medical
attention, asleep or intoxicated. ld. The officer opened the driver's side door, reached in, turned
the motor off, and took possession of the keys. ld. He then attempted to arouse Clayton by
speaking to him loudly and shaking him. ld. After several minutes, Clayton awoke and began
talking, but the officer was unable to distinguish any coherent speech. ld. Based on the location
of the vehicle, the time of day and Clayton'S conduct, the officer suspected intoxication. ld.
Clayton was arrested for DUI. ld.
The Clayton Court first noted that the officer acted reasonably in investigating the
situation. ld. The Court found that when the officer observed the vehicle with its motor running,
lights on, and the driver slumped forward, he had a duty as a police officer to investigate,
pursuant to Cady:
Here, at 1:30 in the morning, the vehicle was in a parking lot with its
lights on and motor running, with the driver slumped forward. Tested upon
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act, this
situation falls outside the boundaries of normal conduct. The driver could have
been hurt or sick, and in need of medical attention. Officer Moser acted prudently
and satisfied his caretaking function when investigating the vehicle.
Clayton, 113 Idaho at 818.
From its inception, a principal element of the community caretaking function was that the
officer's activity must be one that is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. at 441; Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho at 818; State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1009 (Ct.

App. 1989). In later cases, the Idaho Court of Appeals included in its analysis in some, but not
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all, cases involving the community caretaking function, that in order for the community
caretaking function analysis to apply, an officer must possess a subjective belief that an
individual is in need of immediate assistance, although the officer may harbor at least an
expectation of detecting or finding evidence of a crime.

State v. Deccio, 136 Idaho 442, 445

(et. App. 2001) (includes the additional language); State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho at 304 (includes

the additional language); State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821 (Ct. App. 2002) (does not include the
additional language); State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006) (does not include the
additional language ).
It appears that inconsistent standards are being applied to, on the one hand, required that

"the officer's activity must be one that is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute", and on the other hand
provide that "an officer must possess a subjective belief that an individual is in need of
immediate assistance, although the officer may harbor at least an expectation of detecting or
finding evidence of a crime." There is no constitutionally viable support for this deviation from
the standard first set forth in Cady. Idaho appellate courts are not free to interpret the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution more strictly than the United States Supreme Court
does. State v. Guzman, 112 Idaho 981, 988-89 (1992); State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748
(1988). This case presents the Court with an opportunity to refine and define when an officer
can, consistently with the Fourth Amendment, seize an individual when there is no suspicion of
criminal activity.
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11.

Standards for the Community Caretaking Function in Idaho.

In addition to the standards set forth above, in analyzing community caretaking function
cases, Idaho courts have adopted a totality of the circumstances test. State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho
at 754 (1997). The constitutional standard is whether the intrusive action of the police was
reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances. Id.

Reasonableness is determined by

balancing the public need and interest furthered by the police conduct against the degree and
nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen. State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 495
(1992). Community caretaking cannot be invoked to justify the detention of a citizen that is
prompted merely by an officer's curiosity, a subjective but unsubstantiated suspicion of criminal
activity, or even an unwarranted concern that help might be needed. State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho at
302; State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho at 824-25.
iii.

The Community Caretaking Function does not Apply to a Police

Officer's Entry into a Home.
As far back as Cady, supra, the United States Supreme Court has made a distinction
between automobiles and homes in its Fourth Amendment analysis.

In South Dakota v.

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the Court pointed out that warrantless examinations of
automobiles have been upheld in circumstances in which a search of a home or office would not.

Id. at 367. The expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than
that relating to one's home or office. Id. The expectation of privacy as to automobiles is further
diminished by the obviously public nature of automobile travel. Id. at 368.
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The undersigned was unable to find any Idaho appellate opinions which applied the
community caretaking function doctrine to a police officer's entry into a home. All of the Idaho
appellate court opinions applying the community caretaking function exception involved
officers' encounters with drivers of motor vehicles. In State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290 (Ct. App.
2003), the trial court denied Barrett's suppression motion, finding that the officer's entry of
Barrett's home was lawful under both the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement and the officers' community caretaking function. Upon appeal
to the Idaho Court of Appeals, however, the appellate court made its ruling based only upon the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.
The District Court's opinion makes reference to Posey's argument that the community
caretaking function is limited to instances where vehicles are searched. The District Court found
that "[t]his argument ignores the fact that the circumstances in the case at hand arose as the result
of a collision between two vehicles." R., p. 181. However, the reasoning of the District Court is
in error, because even though Posey had been driving a motor vehicle earlier, which resulted in a
collision with another vehicle, the officer's seizure of Posey took place later at her home, not at
the crash scene. What matters is where the seizure took place. The fact that Posey had been
involved in a motor vehicle collision earlier is irrelevant to the issue of whether the Officer
Avriett violated Posey's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
when he forcibly entered Posey's home. Officer Avriett's entry cannot be justified as an exercise
of his community caretaking function, because community caretaking function is not applicable
to an officer's entry into a person's home.
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IV.

The Officer's Entry into Posey's Home was not a Reasonable

Exercise of the Community Caretaking Function.
Even if the community caretaking function is applicable to an officer's entry into a
person's home, in the current case, Officer Avriett' s warrantless entry into Posey's home was not
a reasonable exercise of his community caretaking function.

The information available to

Officer Avriett before he entered the home was that Ms. Posey had left the scene of a twovehicle crash on foot.

Before forcibly entering the home, Officer Avriett was aware that Posey

had allegedly committed the offense of leaving the scene of an injury accident The unnamed
reporting party told Officer Avriett that Ms. Posey was "completely out of it", and she was
bleeding from the face. However, Ms. Posey was able to walk away from the scene on her own,
and walked several blocks to get to her home on the corner of Homestead and Government Way.
Officer Avriett claimed that he forced entry at the residence with a sledge hammer to
check on the Posey's welfare. However, Officer Avriett also testified that when he saw the door
knob moving, he "wasn't sure if the person was either trying to barricade the door or trying to
open it themselves." When asked by the State why he made the decision to tell whomever to
"step away from the door", rather than "can you open the door" or something else, Officer
A vriett referred to past experiences when people want to hide from the police. Before forcibly
entering the home, Officer Avriett asked the reporting party if Posey was "intoxicated". After
breaking into the home, one of the first things Officer Avriett said to Posey was, '[hlow much
did you have to drink today, Valerie [sic]?" Officer Avriett's knowledge that Posey had left the
scene of the crash, which would constitute a crime; his concern that someone may have been
18

barricading the front door to attempt to hide from police; his apparent familiarity with Posey; and
his questions about drinking and intoxication; belie his claim that he went to the house merely
out of concern for Posey's welfare and to render medical assistance to her.

Under the

circumstances of this case, when Officer Avriett broke open the front door of Posey's home with
a sledge hammer, he clearly did so in an effort to apprehend a criminal suspect, rather than in
performance of his community caretaking function.
In making its findings, the District Court stated:
"Further, [the officer] had contact with the reporting party which established the
driver was acting in a manner indicating she needed medical care for injuries she
had sustained in the collision." R., p. 180.
"In this case, a bystander was concerned about the Appellant's welfare to the
extent that he followed her several blocks and explained to officers that she
sustained injuries in the crash." R., p. 181.
The factual record made in this case in the magistrate court does not support these conclusions
made by the District Court, and to the extent that the District Court's decision was in reliance
upon these unsupported conclusions, the District Court was in error.
Officer Avriett's conduct of breaking open Posey's front door with a sledge hammer to
gain entry was not reasonable. His actions go way beyond the police conduct that the Idaho
appellate courts have found to be reasonable in other cases involving the community caretaking
function: Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 (1988), (contact with defendant reasonable after
police officer observed defendant's car parked in a parking lot adjacent to a bar with the engine
running, the headlights on, and the defendant was sitting in the driver's seat behind the steering
wheel, with his head slumped forward); State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992), (police officer's
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brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver's license after making a valid,
lawful contact with the driver was reasonable); State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006),
(defendant's extreme lethargy, the manner his vehicle was parked, and the presence of the
handgun led officer to reasonably conclude there was "something else wrong"). Therefore,
Officer Avriett's warrantless entry into the home was unlawful, and Ms. Posey was unlawfully
seized as a result.
III.

Since the Entry into Posey's Home was Unlawful, the Evidence Obtained

Thereby Should be Excluded.
A.

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment generally may not be used as
evidence against the victim of illegal government action. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11
(2009); State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.

471,485 (1963). This rule, known as the exclusionary rule, applies to evidence obtained directly
from the illegal government action and to evidence discovered through the exploitation of the
original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811; State v.
Page, 140 Idaho at 846; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 487-88. The test is " 'whether,

granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of [the original] illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' " Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 488
(quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959». When a defendant moves to exclude
evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
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government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable.
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.
In State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224 (1993), a police officer entered an apartment building to
serve an arrest warrant on a second floor resident. ld. at 224. The officer observed Curl exit
from another apartment on the second floor, followed by a puff of white smoke emanating from
the interior of the apartment. ld. The officer believed that the odor coming from that apartment
was that of freshly burning marijuana. ld. Curl walked down the hallway toward the officer. ld.
When Curl approached within ten feet and saw the officer, he stopped abruptly, hesitated for a
moment, spun around, and ran back to the apartment from which he had left. ld. The officer ran
after Curl, identified himself as a police officer, paused briefly, pushed the door open, and
entered the apartment. Id. The officer seized certain evidence and cited Curl with possession of
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. ld.
Curl filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officer entered the
apartment, contending that the entry was illegal.

ld. at 224-225.

Upon finding that the

warrantless entry into the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment, the Idaho Supreme Court
ruled that "all fruits derived from that poisonous tree must be suppressed." Id. at 227.
In State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618 (et. App. 1989), police officers responded to a
neighborhood complaint of noise at Wren's residence. ld. at 619. Finding Wren in his back
yard, the officers told him to "quiet down" or he would receive a citation for disturbing the
peace. ld. Wren walked into his house, but a few moments later he reappeared on the back
porch. Id. After directing some abusive language toward the officers, he began to reenter the
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house. Id. The officers pursued him. Id. The officers followed Wren into the house, pushing
their way through the door and chasing him into the living room. Id. There they subdued him by
force and told him, possibly for the first time, that he was under arrest. Id. During a search
incident to the arrest, the officers found a small amount of marijuana in Wren's shirt pocket. Id.
The Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the factual record was insufficient to rule on
the constitutional issue presented in Wren, and remanded the case to the trial court to make
additional findings of fact. Id. at 626. However, the court did find that "if Wren's arrest is
ultimately found to be invalid ... the marijuana in Wren's shirt pocket, found during a search
incident to the arrest, would be excludible," citing Wong Sun, supra. Id. at 627.
B.

Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

The Idaho Constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth Amendment for the
exclusion of illegally-obtained evidence. Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particUlarly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
This section of the Idaho Constitution is substantially similar to the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
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The purpose behind Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution parallels the statement of
purpose given by the United States Supreme Court: "The Fourth Amendment and Article I § 17
are designed to protect a person's legitimate expectation of privacy, which 'society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable'." State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 749 (1988) (citing Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (citations omitted)). "The similarity of language and purpose,

however, does not require this Court to follow United States Supreme Court precedent in
interpreting our own constitution." State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 471 (2001). State courts are
at liberty to find within the provisions of their constitutions greater protection than is afforded
under the federal constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Id; State v.
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987 (1992). Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution affords greater

protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution based upon the longstanding jurisprudence of the Idaho appellate courts, the uniqueness of the State of Idaho, and the
uniqueness of the Idaho Constitution. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho at 472. "Idaho's Constitution
stands on its own, and although we may look to the rulings of the federal courts on the United
States constitution for guidance in interpreting our own state constitutional guarantees, we
interpret a separate and in many respects independent constitution." Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106
Idaho 586, 590 (1984).
Idaho's exclusionary rule was first applied in State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927), 34
years before the federal exclusionary rule was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). The exclusionary rule in Idaho became based wholly upon the state constitution.
State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho at 991.
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In Guzman, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule:
Although we do not doubt and do not challenge the United States Supreme
Court's power to define the parameters of fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, it is equally important that the protections
accorded under our state constitution not be diminished by a permanently
pervading adoption of the federal good-faith exception.
122 Idaho at 988-89.
In Guzman, the Court discussed the gradual chipping-away of the exclusionary rule at the
federal level, and made the distinction between the federal and Idaho constitutions on the
rationale for the exclusionary rule:
The Mapp Court reiterated that the Weeks [Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914)] exclusionary rule was mandated by the constitution in order to
provide a remedy to those who have had their fourth amendment rights violated.
367 U.S. at 648. Additionally, the Court noted that the exclusionary rule had
three other purposes: 1) that the rule would prevent the use of evidence which
was "tantamount" to a coerced confession, 367 U.S. at 656; 2) the rule would
serve as a deterrent to fourth amendment violations, 367 U.S. at 658; and 3) the
rule would protect judicial integrity. 367 U.S. at 659.
In the 1970's, the United States Supreme Court started to rewrite its own
exclusionary rule history. In doing so, it began to deny that the Weeks-Mapp
purposes behind the exclusionary rule had ever existed and instead asserted that
the only purpose which ever justified the exclusionary rule was the deterrence
rationale.

However, in Idaho this Court has held that the exclusionary rule does more than
merely deter police misconduct. In Arregui, we said that the exclusionary rule
was a constitutionally mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures. In State
v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 593 (1978), we said that evidence illegally seized must be
suppressed because to admit it would constitute an independent constitutional
violation by the court in addition to the violation at the time of the illegal search.
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In State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391-92,(1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1057
(1982), while we recognized that the deterrence of police misconduct was a
purpose, we also recognized that judicial integrity mandated the exclusionary rule.
See also State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 524--26 (1986) (recognizing the
different purposes of the state exclusionary rule).

In sum, the United States Supreme Court has abandoned the original purposes of
the exclusionary rule as announced in Weeks and adopted by this Court in
Arregui, in that the federal system has clearly repudiated any purpose behind the
exclusionary rule other than that of a deterrent to illegal police behavior. Thus,
the change in federal law has provided an impetus for a return by this Court to
exclusive state analysis. We believe that the exclusionary rule should be applied
in order to: 1) provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to
an unreasonable government search and/or seizure; 2) deter the police from acting
unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 3) encourage thoroughness in the warrant
issuing process; 4) avoid having the judiciary commit an additional constitutional
violation by considering evidence which has been obtained through illegal means;
and 5) preserve judicial integrity.
122 Idaho at 991 - 993.
In the present case, if not for the illegal entry into Posey's home, Officer Avriett would
not have obtained evidence that Posey had been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the
motor vehicle crash.

The evidence that Posey was under the influence was obtained by

exploitation of the illegal entry into Posey's home and must be suppressed under the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. However, if not suppressible under the Fourth Amendment, the
evidence must still be suppressed pursuant to the greater protections afforded under Article I, §
17 of the Idaho Constitution, due to the uniquely strict protection and recognition of private
property rights and the sanctity of the privacy of the home that we recognize in Idaho.

25

CONCLUSION
Officer Avriett's forced entry into Posey's home was unlawful, because there is no
exception to the warrant requirement that applies in this case. There is no Idaho appellate court
opinion that has applied the community caretaking function to a police officer's entry into a
home, in contrast to a police officer contacting the driver of a motor vehicle. Officer Avriett's
extreme act of breaking open the front door of Posey's home with a sledge hammer was not a
reasonable exercise of the community caretaking function. Officer Avriett did not break in to the
home out of concern for Posey's welfare. Officer Avriett was clearly attempting to apprehend
Posey, whom he suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. Before entering Posey's
home, however, Officer Avriett lacked probable cause to arrest Posey for the offense of driving
under the influence of alcohol. Because the evidence that Posey was under the influence of
alcohol was obtained as a direct result of exploitation of the illegal entry into her home, any
evidence against Posey that was obtained after Officer Avriett broke into her home must be
suppressed, pursuant to the exclusionary rule.
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